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ABSTRACT
As the number and the diversity of news outlets on the Web grow,
so does the opportunity for “alternative” sources of information
to emerge. Using large social networks like Twitter and Facebook,
misleading, false, or agenda-driven information can quickly and
seamlessly spread online, deceiving people or influencing their
opinions. Also, the increased engagement of tightly knit commu-
nities, such as Reddit and 4chan, further compounds the problem,
as their users initiate and propagate alternative information, not
only within their own communities, but also to different ones as
well as various social media. In fact, these platforms have become
an important piece of the modern information ecosystem, which,
thus far, has not been studied as a whole.
In this paper, we begin to fill this gap by studyingmainstream and
alternative news shared on Twitter, Reddit, and 4chan. By analyzing
millions of posts around several axes, we measure how mainstream
and alternative news flows between these platforms. Our results
indicate that alt-right communities within 4chan and Reddit can
have a surprising level of influence on Twitter, providing evidence
that “fringe” communities often succeed in spreading alternative
news to mainstream social networks and the greater Web.
1 INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years, a number of high-profile conspiracy theo-
ries and false stories have originated and spread on the Web. After
the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013, a large number of tweets
started to claim that the bombings were a “false flag” perpetrated
by the United States government [30]. Also, the GamerGate con-
troversy started as a blogpost by a jaded ex-boyfriend that turned
into a pseudo-political campaign of targeted online harassment [6].
More recently, the Pizzagate conspiracy [35] – a debunked theory
connecting a restaurant and members of the US Democratic Party
to a child sex ring – led to a shooting in a Washinghton DC restau-
rant [15]. These stories were all propagated, in no small part, via
the use of “alternative” news sites like Infowars and “fringe” Web
communities like 4chan. Overall, the barrier of entry for such alter-
native news sources has been greatly reduced by the Web and large
social networks. Due to the negligible cost of distributing informa-
tion over social media, fringe sites can quickly gain traction with
large audiences. At the same time, the explosion of information
sources also hinders the effective regulation of the sector, while
further muddying the water when it comes to the evaluation of
news information by readers.
While there are many plausible motives for the rise in alterna-
tive narratives [29], ranging from libelous (e.g., to harm the image
of a particular person or group), political (e.g,. to influence vot-
ers), profit (e.g., to make money from advertising), or trolling [1],
the manner in which they proliferate throughout the Web is still
unknown. Although previous work has examined information cas-
cades, rumors, and hoaxes [12, 18, 27], to the best of our knowledge,
very little work provides a holistic view of the modern information
ecosystem. This knowledge, however, is crucial for understanding
the alternative news world and for designing appropriate detec-
tion/mitigation strategies. Anecdotal evidence and press coverage
suggest that alternative news dissemination might start on fringe
sites, eventually reaching mainstream online social networks and
news outlets [23, 34]. Nevertheless, this phenomenon has not been
measured and no thorough analysis has focused on how news
moves from one online service to another.
In this paper, we address this gap by providing the first large-
scale measurement of how mainstream and alternative news flows
through multiple social media platforms. We focus on the relation-
ship between three fundamentally different social media platforms,
Reddit, Twitter, and 4chan, which we choose because of: 1) their fun-
damental differences as well as their generally accepted “driving” of
substantial portions of the online world; 2) anecdotal evidence that
suggests that specific sub-communities within Reddit and 4chan
act as generators [34] and incubators [17] of fake news stories; and
3) the substantial impact they have in forming and manipulating
peoples’ opinions (and therefore actions), when they constantly
disseminate false information [15].
Contributions. First, we undertake a large-scale measurement
and comparison of the occurrence of mainstream and alternative
news sources across three social media platforms (4chan, Reddit,
and Twitter). Then, we provide an understanding of the temporal
dynamics of how URLs from news sites are posted on the different
social networks. Finally, we present a measurement of the influence
between the platforms that provides insight into how information
spreads throughout the greater Web.
Overall, our findings indicate that Twitter, Reddit, and 4chan
are used quite extensively for the dissemination of both alternative
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and mainstream news. Using a statistical model for influence –
namely, Hawkes processes – we show that each of the platforms
(and, in the case of Reddit, sub-communities) have varying degrees
of influence on each other, and this influence differs with respect to
mainstream and alternative news sources. Naturally, our approach
is not without limitations, which we discuss in details in Section 7.
Paper Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
The next section discusses the social networks and information
sources studied in this paper. Section 3 presents a general charac-
terization of each platform, while Section 4 discusses our tempo-
ral findings. Section 5 reports our measurements of the influence
between the platforms. Finally, after reviewing related work in
Section 6, the paper concludes in Section 7.
2 BACKGROUND AND DATA COLLECTION
In this section, we provide some background information on the
three social media platforms we study, the selection of news sources,
and details on the data we collect.
2.1 Platforms and News Sources
Twitter. Twitter is a micro-blogging, directed social network where
users broadcast 140-character “tweets” to their followers. Some of
its features include the hashtag (a keyword preceded by #), which
makes it easier for users to find and weigh in on tweets around a
theme, as well as retweeting, i.e., rebroadcasting a tweet.
Reddit. The so-called “front page of the Internet” is a social news
aggregator where users post URLs to content along with a title,
and other users can upvote or downvote the post. Votes determine
the ranking of the posts, i.e., the order in which they are displayed.
There is also a threaded comments section for users to discuss a
post, and comments are also subject to the voting system. Although
users canmark each other as friends, the community structure is not
defined by the friendship relation. Rather, communities on Reddit
are formed via the “subreddit” concept. Users can create their own
subreddits, choosing the topic as well as the moderation policy. This
has led to a plethora of communities, ranging from video games
to news and politics, pornography, and even meta-communities
focusing on interactions people have in other subreddits.
4chan. 4chan is a type of discussion forum known as an imageboard:
users create a new thread by making a post with a single image
attached, and perhaps some text, in one of several boards (70 as of
September 2017) for different topics of interest. Other users can add
posts to the thread, with or without an image, and quote or reply
to posts. Users are not required to provide a username to access
or post to 4chan, and the default “Anonymous” is the preferred
and overwhelmingly used identity. Another key characteristic of
4chan is ephemerality: there are a finite number of threads that
can be active at a given time on a given board. When a new thread
is created, an old one is purged based on their ranking within the
“bump” system [16]. Although several boards have a temporary
archive for purged posts, all threads are permanently deleted after 7
days. 4chan is known for its extremely lax moderation: while boards
are divided into safe and not safe for work categories, volunteer
“janitors” and paid employees generally are not concerned with the
language used or the tone of discussion, as long as the discussion
Platform Total Posts % Alt. % Main.
Twitter 587M 0.022% 0.070%
Reddit (posts + comments) 332M 0.023% 0.181%
4chan 42M 0.050% 0.197%
Table 1: Total number of posts crawled and percentage of posts that
contain URLs to our list of alternative and mainstream news sites.
Platform Posts/Comments Alt. URLs Main. URLs
Twitter 486,700 42,550 236,480
Reddit (six selected subreddits) 620,530 40,046 301,840
Reddit (all other subreddits) 1,228,105 24,027 726,948
4chan (/pol/) 90,537 8,963 40,164
4chan (/int/, /sci/, /sp/) 7,131 615 5,513
Table 2: Number of posts/comments that contain aURL to one of our
information sources, as well as the number of unique URLs linking
to alternative and mainstream news sites in our list.
Tweets Retrieved (%) Avg. Retweets Avg. Likes
Alternative 110,629 92,104 (83.2%) 341 ± 1,228 0.82 ± 15.6
Mainstream 376,071 329,950 (87.7%) 404 ± 2,146 0.96 ± 55.6
Table 3: Statistics of alternative and mainstream news URLs in the
tweets in our dataset.
falls within the general topic of the board. Since 4chan’s primary
mode of operation is “anonymous,” it inherently lacks many of the
“social” features of other social media platforms, and there is no
concept of friends/followers.
In this work, we are primarily interested in the Politically In-
correct board, or /pol/, which focuses on the discussion of politics
and world events, and has often been linked to the alt-right [4],
exhibiting a high degree of racist and hate speech content [16].
We also use 4chan’s Sports (/sp/), International (/int/), and Science
(/sci/) boards as a baseline.
News sites. Our analysis uses a set of news websites that can
confidently be labeled as either “mainstream” or “alternative” news.
More specifically, we create a list of 99 news sites including 45
mainstream and 54 alternative ones.1 For the former, we select 45
from the Alexa top 100 news sites, leaving out those based on user-
generated content, those serving specialized content (e.g., finance
news), as well as non-English sites. For the latter, we useWikipedia2
and FakeNewsWatch.3 We also add two state-sponsored alternative
news domains: sputniknews.com and rt.com, as they have recently
attracted public attention due to their posting of controversial, and
seemingly agenda-pushing stories [8].
2.2 Datasets
We gather information from posts, threads, and comments on Twit-
ter, Reddit, and 4chan that contain URLs from the 99 news sites.
With a few gaps (see below), our datasets cover activity on the
three platforms between June 30, 2016 and February 28, 2017. Ta-
ble 1 shows the total number of posts/comments crawled and the
percentage of posts that contains links to URLs from the aforemen-
tioned news domains. We observe that mainstream news URLs are
1The complete list of the 99 sites is available at https://drive.google.com/
open?id=0ByP5a__khV0dM1ZSY3YxQWF2N2c
2https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_fake_news_websites
3http://fakenewswatch.com/
2
Subreddit (Alt.) (%) Subreddit (Main.) (%)
The_Donald 35.37 % politics 12.9 %
politics 8.21 % worldnews 6.24 %
news 3.85 % The_Donald 4.53 %
conspiracy 3.84 % news 4.23 %
Uncensored 2.66 % TheColorIsBlue 3.06 %
Health 2.10 % TheColorIsRed 2.48 %
PoliticsAll 1.54 % willis7737_news 2.27 %
Conservative 1.45 % news_etc 1.94 %
worldnews 1.41 % AskReddit 1.37 %
WhiteRights 1.21 % canada 1.31 %
KotakuInAction 1.04 % EnoughTrumpSpam 1.20 %
HillaryForPrison 0.94 % NoFilterNews 1.16 %
TheOnion 0.94 % BreakingNews24hr 1.07 %
AskTrumpSupporters 0.84 % conspiracy 0.89 %
POLITIC 0.81 % todayilearned 0.83 %
rss_theonion 0.67 % thenewsrightnow 0.78 %
the_Europe 0.67 % europe 0.77 %
new_right 0.60 % ReddLineNews 0.75 %
AskReddit 0.59 % hillaryclinton 0.73 %
AnythingGoesNews 0.51 % nottheonion 0.73 %
Table 4: Top 20 subreddits w.r.t. mainstream and alternative news
URLs occurrence, and their percentage, in Reddit.
present in a greater percentage of posts on 4chan and Reddit than
on Twitter, while alternative ones are about twice as likely to ap-
pear in posts on 4chan than on Twitter or Reddit. Table 2 provides
a summary of our datasets, which we present in more detail below.
Note that we break Reddit and 4chan datasets into two different
instances, as further discussed in Section 3.
Twitter. We collect the 1% of all publicly available tweets with
URLs from the aforementioned news domains between June 30,
2016 and February 28, 2017 using the Twitter Streaming API.4 In
total, we gather 487k tweets containing 279k unique URLs pointing
to mainstream or alternative news sites. Since tweets are retrieved
at the time they are posted, we do not get information such as the
number of times they are re-tweeted or liked. Therefore, between
March and May 2017, we re-crawled each tweet to retrieve this
data. Basic statistics are summarized in Table 3. Due to a failure
in our collection infrastructure, we have some gaps in the Twitter
dataset, specifically between Oct 28–Nov 2 and Nov 5–16, 2016, as
well as Nov 22, 2016 – Jan 13, 2017, and Feb 24–28, 2017.
Reddit. We obtain all posts and comments on Reddit between
June 30, 2016 and February 28, 2017, using data made available on
Pushshift.5 We collect approximately 42M posts, 390M comments,
and 300k subreddits. Once again, we filter posts and comments that
contain URLs from one of the 99 news sites, which yields a dataset
of 1.8M posts/comments and approximately 1.1M URLs.
4chan. For 4chan, we use all threads and posts made on the Po-
litically Incorrect (/pol/) board, as well as /sp/ (Sports), /int/ (In-
ternational), and /sci/ (Science) boards for comparison, using the
same methodology as [16]. We opt to select both not safe for work
boards (i.e., /pol/) and safe for work boards (i.e., /sp/, /int/, and /sci/)
to observe how these compare to each other with respect to the
dissemination of news. The resulting dataset includes 97k posts
4https://dev.twitter.com/streaming/overview
5http://files.pushshift.io/
Domain (Alt.) (%) Domain (Main.) (%)
breitbart.com 55.58 % nytimes.com 14.07 %
rt.com 19.18 % cnn.com 11.23 %
infowars.com 8.99 % theguardian.com 8.86 %
sputniknews.com 3.95 % reuters.com 6.67 %
beforeitsnews.com 2.34 % huffingtonpost.com 5.67 %
lifezette.com 2.28 % thehill.com 5.15 %
naturalnews.com 1.54 % foxnews.com 4.89 %
activistpost.com 1.45 % bbc.com 4.76 %
veteranstoday.com 1.11 % abcnews.go.com 2.94 %
redflagnews.com 0.63 % usatoday.com 2.87 %
prntly.com 0.49 % nbcnews.com 2.86 %
dccclothesline.com 0.4 % time.com 2.57 %
worldnewsdailyreport.com 0.36 % washinghtontimes.com 2.52 %
therealstrategy.com 0.3 % bloomberg.com 2.5 %
disclose.tv 0.23 % wsj.com 2.31 %
clickhole.com 0.2 % cbsnews.com 2.26 %
libertywritersnews.com 0.2 % thedailybeast.com 2.05 %
worldtruth.tv 0.14 % forbes.com 1.87 %
thelastlineofdefence.org 0.07 % nypost.com 1.85 %
nodisinfo.com 0.05 % cncb.com 1.54 %
Table 5: Top 20mainstream and alternative news sites and their per-
centage (six selected subreddits).
and replies, including 56k alternative and mainstream news URLs,
between June 30, 2016 and February 28, 2017. We have some small
gaps due to our crawler failing, specifically, Oct 15–16 and Dec
16–25, 2016 as well as Jan 10–13, 2017.
3 GENERAL CHARACTERIZATION
In this section, we present a general characterization of the main-
stream and alternative news URLs found on the three platforms.
Reddit. We start by identifying news and politics communities.
In Table 4, we report the top 20 subreddits with the most URLs,
along with their percentage. Note that we omit automated ones (e.g.,
/r/AutoNewspaper/) where news articles are posted without user
intervention. Many of the subreddits are indeed related to news
and politics – e.g., ‘The_Donald’ is mostly a community of Donald
Trump supporters, while ‘worldnews’ is focused around globally
relevant events.We also find the presence of the ‘conspiracy’ subred-
dit, which has been involved in disinformation campaigns including
Pizzagate, as well as ‘AskReddit,’ where both mainstream and al-
ternative news sources are used to answer questions submitted by
users. Although the latter is intended for open-ended questions that
spark discussion, it is evident that commenters often try to push
their agenda even in non-political threads. In the end, based on
their propensity to include news URLs of both types, we single out
the follow top six subreddits for further exploration: The_Donald,
politics, conspiracy, news, worldnews, and AskReddit.
In order to get a better view of the popularity of news sites on the
six subreddits, we study the occurrence of each news outlet. Specif-
ically, we find 76k URLs (40k unique) from alternative news and
600k (301k unique) from mainstream news domains. Table 5 reports
the top 20 mainstream/alternative news sites and their percentage
in the six subreddits. The top 20 domains for mainstream news
account for 89% of all mainstream news URLs in our data, while
for alternative domains the percentage is 99%. Known alt-right
3
Domain (Alt.) (%) Domain (Main.) (%)
breitbart.com 46.04 % theguardian.com 19.04 %
rt.com 17.56 % nytimes.com 10.07 %
infowars.com 17.25 % bbc.com 8.99 %
therealstrategy.com 5.63 % forbes.com 6.24 %
sputniknews.com 4.11 % thehill.com 4.95 %
beforeitsnews.com 2.26 % cbc.ca 4.82 %
redflagnews.com 2.04 % foxnews.com 4.79 %
dccclothesline.com 1.37 % wsj.com 4.04 %
naturalnews.com 1.29 % bloomberg.com 3.48 %
clickhole.com 0.53 % reuters.com 2.85 %
activistpost.com 0.41 % usatoday.com 2.02 %
disclose.tv 0.39 % thedailybeast.com 2.02 %
prntly.com 0.26 % nbcnews.com 1.96 %
worldtruth.tv 0.25 % nypost.com 1.95 %
libertywritersnews.com 0.15 % cbsnews.com 1.89 %
worldnewsdailyreport.com 0.06 % abcnews.go.com 1.78 %
mediamass.net 0.04 % time.com 1.71 %
newsbiscuit.com 0.03 % cnbc.com 1.40 %
react365.com 0.02 % washingtontimes.com 1.34 %
the-daily.buzz 0.02 % washingtonexaminer.com 1.33 %
Table 6: Top 20 mainstream and alternative news sites, and their
percentage, in the Twitter dataset.
news outlets, such as breitbart.com and infowars.com, are predomi-
nantly present, as well as state-sponsored alternative domains like
sputniknews.com and rt.com, which have recently been in the spot-
light for disseminating false information and propaganda [8]. The
fact that many such URLs appear in our dataset may indeed be an
indication that the six subreddits significantly contribute to the
dissemination of controversial stories.
Twitter. In our Twitter dataset, we find 129k (42k unique) URLs of
alternative news domains and 413k (236k unique) URLs of main-
stream ones. Recall that we re-crawl tweets to get the number of
retweets and likes, and a small percentage of them are no longer
available as they were either deleted or the associated account was
suspended. This percentage is slightly higher for tweets with URLs
from alternative news, possibly due to the fact that some users tend
to remove controversial content when a particular false story is
debunked [12]. Also, alternative and mainstream news tend to get a
significant number of retweets, at about the same rate (on average,
404 and 341 retweets per tweet, respectively). A similar pattern is
observed for likes (see Table 3).
In Table 6, we report the top 20 mainstream and alternative news
domains, and their percentage, in our Twitter dataset. These cover,
respectively, 86% and 99% of all URLs. Similar to Reddit, there are
many popular alt-right and state-sponsored news outlets.
4chan. In our /pol/ dataset, we find 21k (9k unique) URLs to alterna-
tive news outlets and 82k (40k unique) to mainstream news. Table 7
reports the percentage of URLs of the top 20 domains for each
type of news. These cover 87% and 99% of mainstream and alter-
native news URLs, respectively. Again, we observe that, by far, the
most popular alternative news domains are breitbart.com, rt.com,
infowars.com, and sputniknews.com. For the mainstream news,
we observe that theguardian.com is the most frequently posted,
followed by nytimes.com, cnn.com, and bbc.com. We also obtained
similar statistics for domain popularity in the other boards of 4chan,
but we omit them for brevity.
Domain (Alt.) (%) Domain (Main.) (%)
breitbart.com 53.00 % theguardian.com 14.10 %
rt.com 28.22 % nytimes.com 10.07 %
infowars.com 9.12 % cnn.com 9.90 %
sputniknews.com 3.36 % bbc.com 5.45 %
veteranstoday.com 1.07 % foxnews.com 5.35 %
beforeitsnews.com 0.91 % reuters.com 5.10 %
lifezette.com 0.86 % time.com 3.42 %
naturalnews.com 0.61 % abcnews.go.com 3.40 %
worldnewsdailyreport.com 0.46 % huffingtonpost.com 3.29 %
prntly.com 0.41 % thehill.com 3.04 %
activistpost.com 0.38 % wsj.com 2.82 %
dccclothesline.com 0.29 % washinghtontimes.com 2.77 %
redflagnews.com 0.20 % bloomberg.com 2.75 %
libertywritersnews.com 0.16 % cbc.ca 2.66 %
therealstrategy.com 0.16 % nypost.com 2.65 %
clickhole.com 0.11 % cbsnews.com 2.44 %
disclose.tv 0.10 % nbcnews.com 2.32 %
now8news.com 0.06 % usatoday.com 2.25 %
firebrandleft.com 0.05 % cnbc.com 2.13 %
nodisinfo.com 0.05 % forbes.com 1.68 %
Table 7: Top 20 mainstream and alternative news sites, and their
percentage, in the /pol/ dataset.
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Figure 1: CDF of URL appearance counts within a platform: (a) al-
ternative news and (b) mainstream news.
To get a better view of the platforms’ URL posting behavior,
Figure 1 plots the CDF of URL appearances (i.e., how many times
a specific URL appears) within a particular platform. We observe
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Figure 2: Top 20 domains and each platform’s fraction for (a) alternative and (b) mainstream news.
that a substantial portion of the URLs appear only once for both
alternative and mainstream news, and that, on Twitter, alternative
news tends to appear more times than mainstream news. For /pol/
and the six subreddits, we observe a similar behavior for both
mainstream and alternative news.
Next, in Figure 2, we compare how popular domains, in both
categories, appear on the three platforms (i.e., Twitter, the six sub-
reddits, and /pol/). We find that the top 4 alternative domains
– breitbart.com, rt.com, infowars.com, sputniknews.com – influ-
ence the three platforms more or less in the same way. However,
some outlets appear predominantly in some platforms but not in
others; e.g., therealstrategy.com is popular only on Twitter, while
lifezette.com and veteranstoday.com are popular on the 6 subreddits
and /pol/, but not on Twitter.
We believe the primary reason for this has to do with Twitter
bots. We cannot exclude with certainty that bots do not exist on
4chan, while bots are actually acceptable on Reddit (as long as they
follow the rules of Reddit’s API [33]), however, they are certainly
more prevalent on Twitter. Thus, if a particular domain is popular
on Twitter because of the influence of bots, then it might not be
popular on Reddit and 4chan. We have also considered ways to
factor out posting behavior from bots, especially for Twitter, such
as the one proposed in [7]. However, we have not removed this
activity due to: 1) posting behavior from bots can affect real users’
posting behavior, hence this activity is part of the overall news
dissemination ecosystem and needs to be accounted for; and 2) the
satisfactory performance of such approaches is yet to be proven.
We also measure the fraction of news URLs that are alternative,
per user, in Figure 3. We report this fraction only for Reddit and
Twitter users, since on 4chan posts are anonymous.We find that 80%
of the users of both platforms share only URLs from mainstream
news, while, 13% of Twitter users – which are likely bots [31] –
exclusively post URLs to alternative news. We observe from Fig-
ure 3(b), which shows the ratio for users sharing URLs from both
categories, that there is a wide distribution, especially on the six
selected subreddits, between people that rarely share alternative
news (fraction close to 0) and those who share them almost all the
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Alternative News Fraction
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CD
F
Reddit (6 selected subreddits) Twitter
(a)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Alternative News Fraction
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
CD
F
Reddit (6 selected subreddits) Twitter
(b)
Figure 3: CDF of the fraction of URLs from alternative news and
overall news URLs for (a) all users in our Twitter and Reddit
datasets, and (b) users that shared URLs from both mainstream and
alternative news.
time (fraction close to 1). Moreover, we find that Twitter users share
more alternative news: just 5% of these users have a fraction below
0.2, which might be also attributed to the presence of bots.
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Figure 4: Normalized daily occurrence of URLs for (a) alternative news, (b) mainstream news, and (c) fraction of alternative news over all news.
Take-Aways. In summary, our general characterization yields the
following findings: 1) Specific sub-communities within Reddit drive
the dissemination of both alternative and mainstream news (Ta-
ble 4); 2) news domain popularity is similar for both alternative
and mainstream domains in the three platforms with some excep-
tions, such as lifezette.com and veteranstoday.com (Tables 5, 6, 7
and Figure 2); 3) Twitter users are more aggressively promoting
alternative news, compared to mainstream news (Figure 1); and 4)
Twitter users also have a greater alternative to mainstream news ra-
tio when compared to users that post in the six selected subreddits
(Figure 3).
4 TEMPORAL DYNAMICS
In this section, we present the results of a cross-platform temporal
analysis of the way news are posted on Twitter, Reddit, and 4chan.
4.1 URL Occurrence
In Figure 4, we measure the daily occurrence of news URLs over the
three platforms normalized by the average daily number of URLs
shared in each community.6 We find that /pol/ and the six selected
subreddits exhibit a much higher percentage of occurrences of al-
ternative news compared to the other communities (Figure 4(a)),
whereas, for mainstream news, the sharing behavior is more simi-
lar across platforms (Figure 4(b)). There are also some interesting
spikes, likely related to the 2016 US elections, on the date of the
first presidential debate and election day itself. These findings in-
dicate that the selected sub-communities are heavily utilized for
the dissemination of alternative news. We also study the fraction
of alternative news URLs with respect to overall news URLs (Fig-
ure 4(c)), highlighting that mainstream news URLs are overall more
“popular” than the alternative news URLs. Note that the Twitter
spike in Figure 4(c) appears to be an artifact of a failure in our
collection infrastructure.
As some users repost the same URL many times within the same
platform, we next study such reposting behavior and extract in-
sights while comparing platforms. In Figure 5, we plot the CDF of
the time difference between the first occurrence of a URL and its
6Gaps in the plot correspond to gaps in our dataset due to crawler failure.
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Figure 5: CDF of time difference (in hours) between the first occur-
rence of a URL and its next occurrences on each platform for (a)
alternative and (b) mainstream news.
next occurrences on the same platform. Both alternative and main-
stream news URLs are recycled over time within the platform (even
after several months), but Twitter exhibits a smaller lag between
the first occurrence and later ones compared to the other two plat-
forms. In all three platforms, there is an inflection point at the 24h
period, which probably signifies the day-to-day behavior of news
propagation within a platform, and this is true for both alternative
and mainstream news. Finally, mainstream news seem to propagate
6
Comparison Type of News #URLs where #URLs where
(1st vs 2nd) 1st is faster 2nd is faster
Reddit vs Twitter Mainstream 18,762 11,416
Alternative 5,232 4,301
/pol/ vs Twitter Mainstream 2,938 4,700
Alternative 778 2,099
/pol/ vs Reddit Mainstream 5,382 14,662
Alternative 1,455 3,695
Table 8: Statistics of URLs for the comparisons of time difference
between platforms. Reddit refers to the six selected subreddits.
faster in these platforms than alternative news, especially on the
six subreddits; for Twitter and /pol/ the difference is not evident.
We also study the inter-arrival time of reposted URLs. Figure 6
shows the CDF of the mean inter-arrival time of URLs that appear
more than one time in each platform. Each platform exhibits unique
behavior, confirmed by a two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
showing significant differences between the distributions (p <
0.01 for each pairwise comparison). However, /pol/ and the six
subreddits exhibit similar time-related sharing behavior for both
mainstream and alternative news URLs, and Twitter has smaller
mean inter-arrival time overall. Interestingly, the six subreddits
appear to have a duality in reposting behavior: for URLs with small
inter-arrival time, it follows the faster pace of Twitter, whereas, for
URLs with longer inter-arrival times, it follows /pol/.
4.2 Cross Platform Analysis
We now look at URLs that appear on more than one platform and
study the time at which they are shared. Figure 7 plots the CDF
of the time difference (in seconds) between the first occurrence
of a URL on pairs of platforms, while Table 8 reports the num-
bers of URLs involved in each comparison. We make the follow-
ing observations: first, when comparing pairs of distributions for
a given category of URLs, they are statistically different (a two
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null hypothesis with
p < 10−4). Second, alternative news appear on multiple platforms
faster than mainstream news. This is consistent regardless of the
pair of platforms we consider, and the sequence of appearances
(i.e., first in platform A and then B, vs. first in B and then in A).
Third, we notice the presence of a “turning point” with respect
to the delay between URL appearance on each platform, which
seems to be consistent across all pairs of platforms and types of
news, and matches the 24h period observed earlier. Finally, there is
a cross point when comparing URLs first posted on platform A and
then on B, and URLs which were posted first in B and then on A
(i.e., when the lines for the same type of URLs cross). Such a point
represents which portion of URLs appear faster in one platform
than the other. For the Twitter-six selected subreddits comparison,
alternative (mainstream) news appear faster on Twitter than the six
subreddits 80% of the time (50%), with these URLs exhibiting slower
propagation, since the turning point is at ∼1 hour (5 hours). Sim-
ilarly, for the Twitter-/pol/ comparison, alternative (mainstream)
news appear faster on Twitter than /pol/ 70% (5%) of the time, with
the turning point at 1 day (2 days). Finally, for the six selected
subreddits-/pol/ comparison, alternative (mainstream) news appear
faster on the six subreddits than /pol/ for 65% (40%) of the time,
with the turning point around 18 hours (12 hours).
Sequence Alternative (%) Mainstream (%)
4 only 3,236 (4.4%) 18,654 (3.7%)
4→R 1,118 (1.5%) 4,606 (0.9%)
4→T 315 (0.5%) 861 (0.17%)
R only 24,292 (33.3%) 230,602 (46.1%)
R→4 2,181 (3.0%) 11,307 (2.3%)
R→T 4,769 (6.5%) 16,685 (3.35%)
T only 32,443 (44.5%) 204,836 (41%)
T→4 585 (0.8%) 1,345 (0.26%)
T→R 3,964 (5.5%) 10,640 (2.12%)
Table 9: Distribution of URLs according to the sequence of first ap-
pearance within platforms for all URLs, considering only the first
hop. “4” stands for /pol/ (4chan), “R” for the six selected subreddits
(Reddit), and “T” for Twitter.
Sequence Alternative (%) Mainstream (%)
4→R→T 128 (5.5%) 552 (8.9%)
4→T→R 145 (6.2%) 290 (4.7%)
R→4→T 335 (14.4%) 1,525 (24.5%)
R→T→4 841 (36.3%) 2,189 (35.3%)
T→4→R 192 (8.2%) 486 (7.8%)
T→R→4 673 (29%) 1,166 (18.8%)
Table 10: Distribution of URLs according to the sequence of first ap-
pearance within a platform for URLs common to all platforms. “4”
stands for /pol/ (4chan), “R” for the six selected subreddits (Reddit),
and “T” for Twitter.
Next, given the set of unique URLs across all platforms and the
time they appear for the first time, we analyze their appearance in
one, two, or three platforms, and the order in which this happens.
For each URL, we find the first occurrence on each platform and
build corresponding “sequences,” e.g., if a URL first appears on
the six subreddits (Reddit) and subsequently on /pol/ (4chan), the
sequence is Reddit→ 4chan (R→4). Table 9 reports the distribution
of the sequences of appearances considering only the first hop, i.e.,
up to the first two platforms in the sequence. The majority of URLs
only appear on one platform: 82% of alternative URLs and 89% of
mainstream news URLs. Also, both alternative and mainstream
news URLs tend to appear on the six subreddits first and later
appear on either Twitter or /pol/, and on Twitter before /pol/.
We also study the temporal dynamics of URLs that appear on
all three platforms, with triplets of sequences. Table 10 reports the
distribution of these sequences. The most common sequences are
similar for both alternative and mainstream news URLs: R→T→4,
R→4→T, and T→R→4 are the top three sequences. As already
mentioned, the six selected subreddits “outperform” both other
platforms in terms of the speed of sharing mainstream and alter-
native news URLs, as evidenced by the fact that it is at the head of
the sequence for 51% and 59% of alternative and mainstream news
URLs, respectively.
Finally, we analyze the source of the URLs for each of the three
platforms, as follows. We create two directed graphs, one for each
type of news,G = (V ,E), where V represents alternative or main-
stream domains, as well as the three platforms, and E the set of
sequences that consider only the first-hop of the platforms. For
example, if a breitbart.com URL appears first on Twitter and later
on the six selected subreddits, we add an edge from breitbart.com
to Twitter, and from Twitter to the six selected subreddits. We also
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Figure 6: CDF for mean inter-arrival time for the URLs that occur more than once for (a) common alternative news URLs; (b) common main-
stream news URLs; (c) all alternative news URLs, and (d) all mainstream news URLs.
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Figure 7: CDF of the difference between the first occurrence of a URL between (a) six selected subreddits and Twitter, (b) /pol/ and Twitter, and
(c) /pol/ and six selected subreddits.
add weights on these edges based on the number of such unique
URLs. By examining the paths we can discern which domains’ URLs
tend to appear first on each of the platforms. Figure 8 shows the
graphs built for alternative and mainstream domains. Comparing
the thickness of the outgoing edges, one can see that breitbart.com
URLs appear first in the six selected subreddits more often than
on Twitter and more frequently than on /pol/. However, for other
popular alternative domains, such as infowars.com, rt.com, and
sputniknews.com, URLs appear first on Twitter more often than the
six selected subreddits and /pol/. Also, /pol/ is rarely the platform
where a URL first shows up. For the mainstream news domains, we
note that URLs from nytimes.com and cnn.com tend to appear first
more often on the selected subreddits than Twitter and /pol/, how-
ever, URLs from other domains like bbc.com and theguardian.com
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Figure 8: Graph representation of news ecosystem (a) alternative news domains and (b) mainstream news domains. Edges are colored the same
as their source node.
tend to appear first more often on Twitter than the selected subred-
dits. Similar to the alternative domains graph, there is no domain
where /pol/ dominates in terms of first URL appearance.
4.3 Take-Aways
In summary, our temporal dynamics analysis shows that: 1) Spe-
cific sub-communities are heavily utilized for the dissemination
of alternative news (Figure 4); 2) Twitter URL posting behavior is
more aggressive for both alternative and mainstream news when
compared to the other two platforms (Figure 5 and 6); 3) Both al-
ternative and mainstream URLs tend to appear on the six selected
subreddits before appearing on Twitter and/or /pol/ (Table 8 and
Figure 7). This may be due the nature of the Reddit platform, where
URL posting is the prevalent way to disseminate information; 4)
URLs from specific domains tend to appear first on a particular
platform. For example, for alternative news breitbart.com, URLs
appear first on the six selected subreddits, while on Twitter the
same applies for infowars.com, rt.com, and sputniknews.com. The
/pol/ does not dominate for any of the domains (Figure 8).
Note that our analysis does not factor out the gaps in our Twitter
dataset. Consequently, some of the results may be affected by the
fact that some URLs from Twitter might be missing. To address this
issue, in Section 5, we omit a subset of the URLs impacted by the
gaps in our datasets. Furthermore, the use of a rigorous statistical
model (Hawkes processes) helps to mitigate this potential issue.
5 INFLUENCE ESTIMATION
Thus far, our measurements have shown relative differences in
how news media is shared on Reddit, Twitter, and 4chan. In this
section, we provide meaningful evidence of how the individual
platforms influence the media shared on other platforms. We do so
by using a mathematical technique known as Hawkes processes.
The_Donald
1 
Twitter
/pol/
2
3
4
5.1 5.2
5.3
Figure 9: A depiction of a Hawkes model showing how the interac-
tion between events on 3 processes might look like. Note: this ex-
ample is inspired by [20].
These statistical models can be used for modeling the dissemination
of information inWeb communities [10] as well as measuring social
influence [13].
5.1 Hawkes Processes
Note that the three platforms we measure do not obviously exist
in a vacuum, rather, they exist within the greater ecosystem of the
Web. Imagine, however, that each of the platforms were entirely self-
contained, with a completely disjoint set of users. In such a scenario,
there would be a natural rate at which URLs will be posted, and it
would be possible to model this using standard Poisson processes.
However, our platforms are clearly not independent. While they
do exhibit their own background URL posting rates and internal
influence, they are also affected by each other, as well as by the
greater Web.
A Hawkes model consists of a number, K , of point processes,
each with a “background rate” of events λ0,k . An event on one
process can cause an impulse response on other processes, which
increases the probability of an event occurring above the processes’
background rates. Figure 9 depicts an example of what a sequence of
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events on a Hawkes model with three processes might look like, us-
ing The_Donald, Twitter, and /pol/ communities for representative
purposes.
First, an event 1 (a URL being posted) occurs on Twitter; this is
caused by the background rate of the process, meaning that the URL
was posted not because it was seen on any of the platforms in the
model, but because it was seen elsewhere (including a user finding
it organically). This initial event causes an impulse response on the
rates of the other processes, The_Donald and /pol/, meaning that
the URL is more likely to be posted on those platforms after having
been seen on Twitter. Eventually, this causes another event on
The_Donald (2), which in turn causes an event on /pol/. A process
can cause an additional impulse response to itself, as seen with
event 3, and multiple events can be caused in response to a single
event, as seen with event 4 causing events 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3. Naturally,
the data we collect does not explicitly state which events are caused
by other events, or which are caused by the background rate.
For our purposes, fitting a Hawkes model to a series of events
on the different platforms gives us values for the background rates
for each platform along with the probability of an event on one
platform causing events on other platforms. We emphasize that
the background rates of the Hawkes processes allows us to also
account for the probability of an event caused by external sources
of information. For example, it includes the probabilities of events
caused by Facebook as well as other platforms. Thus, while we are
only able to model the specific influences of the three platforms we
study, the resulting probabilities are affirmatively attributable to
each of them; the influence of the greater Web is captured by the
background rates.
For a discrete-time Hawkes model, time is divided into a series
of bins of duration ∆t , and events occurring within the same time
bin do not interact with each other. The rate of each k-th process,
λt,k is given by:
λt,k = λ0,k +
K∑
k ′=1
t−1∑
t ′=1
st ′,k ′ · hk ′→k [t − t ′]
where s ∈ NT×K is the matrix of event counts (howmany events oc-
cur for process k at time t ) and hk ′→k [t − t ′] is an impulse response
function that describes the amplitude of influence that events on
process k ′ have on the rate of process k .
Following [20], the impulse response function hk→k ′[t − t ′]
can be decomposed into a scalar weightWk→k ′ and a probability
mass function Gk→k ′[d]. The weight specifies the strength of the
interaction from process k to process k ′ and the probability mass
function specifies how the interaction changes over time:
hk→k ′[d] =Wk→k ′Gk→k ′[d]
The weight valueWk→k ′ can be interpreted as the expected number
of child events that will be caused on process k ′ after an event
on process k . The probability mass function Gk→k ′ specifies the
probability that a child event will occur at each specific time lagd∆t ,
up to a maximum lag ∆tmax . This interpretation ofWk→k ′ is useful
because it allows us to compare howmuch influence platforms have
on each other. For instance, we can examine whether a URL posted
on Twitter or on Reddit is more likely to cause the same URL to be
posted on 4chan, or if there is a difference in influence from one
platform to another between URLs for mainstream and alternative
news sites.
5.2 Methodology
We now provide more details about our experiments, once again,
considering 4chan (/pol/), Twitter, and the six subreddits. We study
Hawkes processes at the subreddit granularity to get a better un-
derstanding of the various platforms and particular subreddits.
We aim to examine how these platforms and subreddits influence
each other, so we model the arrival of URLs, in posts or tweets, with
a Hawkes model with K = 8 point processes—one for Twitter, one
for /pol/, and one for each of the subreddits. The model is fully
connected, i.e., it is possible for each process to influence all the
others, as well as itself, which describes behavior where participants
on a platform see a URL and re-post it on the same platform. For
example, with Twitter, this value (WTwitter→Twitter) would likely be
quite high, given that tweets are commonly re-tweeted a number of
times: the initial tweet containing a URL is likely to cause a number
of re-tweets, also containing the URL, on the same platform.
We select URLs that have at least one event in Twitter, /pol/, and
at least one of the subreddits, and we model each URL individually.
The missing Twitter data (due to our dataset gaps; see Section 2.2)
affects 3,177 (37%) of the URLs. One way to mitigate the impact
of this missing data is to remove events for which it has a larger
impact. E.g., if an event spans 100 days, the missing Twitter data
has less of an effect than if the event only spanned two days. Thus,
we examine URLs from other platforms that overlap with any of the
missing days and remove the 10% of URLs (895) with the shortest
total duration from the first event recorded until the last event
recorded. This results in the missing data making up a smaller
portion of the overall duration of the events.
The number of remaining URLs and events included for each
platform are shown in Table 11. For each URL, we create a matrix
s ∈ NT×8 containing the number of events (URL posts) per minute
for each of the platforms/subreddits. Here, T is the number of
minutes from the first recorded post of the URL on any platform, to
the last recorded post of a URL on any platform (NB: this value can
be different for each URL). We select ∆t = 1 minute as a reasonable
compromise between accuracy and computational cost. Using this
bin size, 92% of events are in a bin by themselves, and another 5.4%
share a bin, but only with other events from the same platform or
subreddit, meaning that timing interactions between the platforms
are not lost.
Next, we fit a Hawkes model for each URL using the approach
described in [20, 21], which uses Gibbs sampling to infer the param-
eters of the model from the data, including the weights, background
rates, and shape of the impulse response functions between the
different processes. By setting ∆tmax = 60 · 12 = 720 minutes, we
say that a given event can cause other events within a 12-hour time
window. Experiments with other values (6, 12, 24, and 48 hours)
gave similar results. After fitting the models, we have the values
for theW matrix – i.e., the weights of the interactions between
events on different processes for each URL. These weights can
then be interpreted as the expected number of events. For example,
WTwitter→/pol/ = 0.1 would mean that an event on Twitter will
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The_Donald worldnews politics news conspiracy AskReddit /pol/ Twitter
URLs Mainstream 3,097 2,523 3,578 2,584 907 841 5,589 5,589
Alternative 2,008 252 813 362 321 100 2,136 2,136
Total 5,105 2,775 4,391 2,946 1,228 941 7,725 7,725
Events Mainstream 12,312 7,517 26,160 5,794 1,995 2,302 19,746 36,250
Alternative 7,797 458 2,484 586 497 176 7,322 23,172
Total 20,109 7,975 28,644 6,380 2,492 2,478 27,068 59,422
Mean λ0 Mainstream 0.001502 0.001382 0.001265 0.001392 0.000501 0.000107 0.001564 0.002330
Alternative 0.001627 0.000619 0.000696 0.000553 0.000423 0.000034 0.001525 0.002803
Table 11: Total URLs with at least one event in Twitter, /pol/, and at least one of the subreddits; total events for mainstream and alternative
URLs, and the mean background rate (λ0) for each platform/subreddit. Note that the numbers reported on this table are lower than the ones
reported by Tables 2 and 3 due to the fact that we only select URLs that appear in multiple sub-communities within the three platforms and
we drop a number of URLs that overlap the time period where data is missing.
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Mean Weights - Pct. Increase/Decrease of Alternative over Mainstream URLs
Figure 10:Meanweights for alternative URLs (A), mainstreamURLs
(M), and the percent increase/decrease between mainstream and al-
ternative (also indicated by the coloration). Stars indicate the level
of statistical significance (p-value) between theweight distributions:
no stars indicate no statistical significance, while * and ** indicate,
resp., statistical significance with p < 0.05 and p < 0.01.
cause n events on /pol/, where n is drawn from a Poisson distribu-
tion with rate parameter 0.1. Finally, for each URL, we also get the
λ0,k values for each process, which are the background rates for
event arrivals that are not caused by other events in the system we
model. Again, these background rates capture events due to some
other platform, e.g., someone posting the URL after reading it on
the original site or seeing the URL on another site not included in
the model, like Facebook.
5.3 Results
Looking at the number of URLs in Table 11, we note that there are
substantially more events for mainstream than alternative news
URLs. However, for Twitter, /pol/, and The_Donald, the ratios of
events to URLs for alternative news URLs are similar to or greater
than the ratios for mainstream ones. These high ratios explain the
high background rates (cf. Table 11) for alternative news URLs for
these platforms despite the lower number of events.
From the Hawkes models for each URL, we obtain the weight
matrixW which specifies the strength of the connections between
the different platforms and subreddits. The mean weight values
over all URLs for alternative and mainstream news URLs, as well
as the percentage difference between them are presented in Fig-
ure 10. First, we look at Twitter. Background rates are high for both
mainstream and alternative news URLs, which is not surprising
given the large number of users on the platform. The values for
WTwitter→Twitter are also substantially higher than all other weights:
0.1096 for mainstream news URLs and 0.1554 for alternative news
URLs. This reflects the ease and common practice of re-tweeting: a
URL in a tweet is likely to generate other events as users re-tweet
it. There are different possible explanations for why the Twitter to
Twitter rate for alternative news URLs is much greater than the rate
for mainstream news URLs. The first is bot activity—if automated
Twitter bots are used to spread alternative news URLs, it could
result in a much higher rate of tweeting and re-tweeting. Another
possible explanation is the behavior of users who read news stories
from alternative sources; they might be more inclined to re-tweet
the URL [14].
Looking at the weights for Twitter to the other platforms, except
The_Donald, they are all greater for mainstream news URLs, mean-
ing that the average tweet containing a mainstream URL is more
likely to cause a subsequent post on the other platforms than the
average tweet containing an alternative URL. The next communi-
ties most likely to cause events on others are The_Donald and /pol/.
It is worth noting that The_Donald is the only platform/subreddit
that has greater alternative URL weights for all of its inputs. As-
suming that the population of The_Donald users that also read,
say, worldnews is the same for both alternative and mainstream
news URLs—which is reasonable—then the difference in weights
implies that the users have a stronger preference for re-posting
alternative news URLs back to The_Donald than for mainstream
news URLs. The opposite can be seen for worldnews and politics,
where most of the input weights are stronger for mainstream news.
However, despite the higher weights for alternative news URLs,
The_Donald is also, interestingly, influencedmore strongly bymain-
stream news URLs than alternative news URLs on all platforms,
with the exception of Twitter. This is in part because of the greater
number of mainstream URL events, but The_Donald also has a
higher background rate for alternative news URLs than mainstream
news URLs, which implies that a lot of the alternative news URLs
on the platform are coming from other sources.
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Pct. of Alternative URLs - Pct. of Mainstream URLs
Figure 11: Mean estimated percentage of alternative URL events
caused by alternative news URL events (A), mean estimated percent-
age of mainstream news URL events caused by mainstream news
URL events (M), and the difference between alternative and main-
stream news (also indicated by the coloration).
To assess the statistical significance of the results, we perform
two sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests on the weight distribu-
tions of mainstream and alternative news URLs for each source-
destination pair (depicted as stars in Figure 10). Rejecting the null
hypothesis here implies a difference in the way mainstream and al-
ternative news URLs propagate from the source to the destination—
either mainstream news URLs tend to cause more events on other
platforms than alternative news URLs, or the opposite. Unsurpris-
ingly, many of the source-destination pairs have no significant
difference. However, in most cases where Twitter is the source
community there is a significant statistical difference with p < 0.01.
I.e., for some communities, Twitter is used not just to disseminate
news, but to disseminate news from a specific type of source.
Figure 11 illustrates the estimated total impact of the different
platforms on each other, for both mainstream and alternative news
URLs. The impact is estimated using the weight values that are
shown in Figure 10. Since theweight values can be interpreted as the
expected number of additional events caused as a consequence of
an event, we can estimate the percentage of events on each platform
that were caused by each of the other platforms by multiplying the
weight by the actual number of events that occurred on the source
platform and dividing by the number of events that occurred on
the destination platform:
PctA→B =
∑
u ∈urls
(
WA→B ·∑Tt=1 st,A)∑
u ∈urls
∑T
t=1 st,B
The percentages for mainstream and alternative news URLs as well
as the difference between them are presented in Figure 11.
Twitter contributes heavily to both types of events on the other
platforms—and is in fact the most influential single source for most
of the other platforms. Despite Twitter’s lower weights for alterna-
tive news URLs, it actually has a greater influence on alternative
than mainstream news URLs, in terms of percentage of events
caused, on all the other platforms/subreddits. This is due to the fact
that, even though it has lower weights, the largest proportion of
alternative URL events are on Twitter. After Twitter, The_Donald
and /pol/ also have a strong influence on the alternative news URLs
that get posted on other platforms. The_Donald has a stronger
effect for alternative news URLs on all platforms except Twitter—
although it still has the largest alternative influence on Twitter,
causing an estimated 2.72% of alternative news URLs tweeted. In-
terestingly, The_Donald causes 8% of /pol/’s alternative news URLs,
while /pol/’s influence on The_Donald is less, at 5.7%. For the main-
stream news URLs the strength of influence is reversed. Specifically,
/pol/’s influence on The_Donald is 8.61% whereas The_Donald’s
influence on /pol/ is 6.13%.
In descending order, the influences on Twitter for mainstream
news URLs are politics (4.29%), /pol/ (3.01%), The_Donald (2.97%),
worldnews (2.74%), news (1.81%), AskReddit (1.34%), and conspiracy
(1.04%). The strongest influences for alternative news URLs are,
unsurprisingly, The_Donald (2.72%) and /pol/ (1.96%), followed
by politics (1.10%), worldnews (0.60%), AskReddit (0.55%), news
(0.50%), and conspiracy (0.46%). Twitter influences the alternative
news URLs on other platforms to a large degree—but the largest
alternative URL inputs to Twitter are The_Donald and /pol/. While
we are only looking at a closed system of 8 different platforms
and subreddits, we note that Twitter is undoubtedly effective at
propagating information. Thus the influence these two communities
have on Twitter is likely to have a disproportional impact on the
greater Web compared to their relatively minuscule userbase.
5.4 Take-Aways
In summary, the main take-aways from our influence analysis in-
clude: 1) Hawkes processes allow us to obtain a quantifiable influ-
ence betweenWeb communities while taking into account influence
from external sources of information; and 2) Twitter is influenced
by smaller fringe Web communities, e.g., The_Donald and /pol/ are
responsible for around 6% of mainstream news URLs and over 4.5%
of alternative news URLs posted to Twitter that appear on all three
platforms. Considering Twitter’s relative size, the impact of these
fringe communities cannot be overstated.
6 RELATEDWORK
Wenow review prior work on disinformation propagation dynamics
in social networks and on detecting false information sources.
Disinformation dynamics. Kwon et al. [19] study the character-
istics of rumor propagation on Twitter. They analyze a corpus of
1.7B tweets, covering three and a half years of Twitter data, and
extract 104 viral events, which are then annotated by human coders.
They study debunked stories from false information busting sites
such as Snopes and compare temporal, linguistics, and structural
characteristics to legitimate information. Friggeri et al. [12] also use
stories that Snopes determined as false to study the propagation
and the evolution of false information on Facebook, finding it to be
quite bursty, and that posts containing a comment with a link to
Snopes are more likely to get deleted. Kumar et al. [18] study the
presence of hoaxes in Wikipedia articles. They report that while
most are detected quickly and have little impact, some end up cited
widely on the Web.
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Shao et al. [27] introduce Hoaxy, a platform providing infor-
mation about the dynamics of false information propagation on
Twitter. They also study a sample of 1.4M tweets, finding that the
diffusion of fact-checking content lags that of false information by
10-20 hours and that the top 1% users with the most tweets share
a much higher ratio of false information. Finn et al. [11] present
TwitterTrails, a website allowing users to study propagation of
false information on Twitter, i.e., to visualize indications of bursty
activity, community skepticism, temporal characteristics of propa-
gation, as well as re-tweets networks. Also, Del Vicario et al. [9]
analyze how Facebook users perceive and react to conspiracy theo-
ries vs. scientific stories, finding two polarized and homogeneous
communities that have similar content consumption patterns but
exhibit different cascade dynamics.
Situngkir [28] empirically studies an Indonesian hoax on Twitter,
finding that it spread broadly and quickly (within two hours), and
that it would have spread more if a conventional media outlet did
not publicly deny it. He also argues that hoaxes can propagate easily
if there is collaboration between the recipients of the hoax. Arif
et al. [3] present a case study based on a hostage crisis in Sydney,
analyzing 5.4M tweets from three main perspectives: 1) volume (i.e.,
number of rumor-related messages per time interval), 2) exposure
(i.e., number of individuals exposed to the rumor), and 3) content
production (i.e., whether the content is written by the user or is
re-shared). Andrews et al. [2] study two crisis-related incidents on
Twitter aiming to determine the effect of “official” accounts with
respect to the containment of rumors. Authors show that official
account can significantly contribute to stopping the propagation
of the rumor by actively engaging in conversations related to the
incidents. Finally, Mendoza et al. [22] study the dissemination of
false rumors vs. confirmed news on Twitter the days following the
2010 earthquake in Chile, concluding that an aggregate analysis on
the flow of tweets can distinguish the former from the latter.
Detecting false information sources. Shah et al. [26] formulate
the problem of finding the source of false information as a maxi-
mum likelihood estimation problem, using a metric called rumor
centrality. They evaluate it for all nodes in the network using a
simple linear time message-passing algorithm, and the node with
the highest rumor centrality is deemed to be the most likely source.
Authors show, experimentally, that the model can distinguish the
source of false information with a maximum error of 7 hops for
general networks and 4 for tree networks. Wang et al. [32] study
the problem from a statistical point of view, proposing a source de-
tection framework, also based on rumor centrality, which supports
multiple snapshots of the network during the false information
spread. They show that using two network snapshots instead of
one can significantly improve detection.
Budak et al. [5] study the notion of competing campaigns in a
social network and address the problem of influence limitation to
counteract the effect of misinformation. Nguyen et al. [24] look
for the k users that are most suspected to have originated false
information, using a reverse diffusion process along with a ranking
process. Seo et al. [25] aim to identify the source of rumors in online
social networks by injecting monitoring nodes across the social
graph. They propose an algorithm that observes the information
received by the monitoring nodes in order to identify the source.
They indicate that with sufficient number of monitoring sources
they can recognize the source with high accuracy.
Finally, Starbird [29] performs a qualitative analysis on tweets
pertaining to shooting events and conspiracy theories, using graph
analysis on the domains linked from the tweets, and provides insight
on how various websites work to promote conspiracy theories and
push political agendas.
Remarks. In contrast to prior work, this paper provides insights
on disinformation dynamics on social networks from a compre-
hensive (i.e., multi-service) point of view. In other words, we study
major online social networks and various news sites that actively
contribute to information diffusion across theWeb, specifically, ana-
lyzing the dynamics and information flow of Reddit, 4chan, Twitter,
and several news sites. Furthermore, we measure the influence
that each platform has to each other using a rigorous statistical
model—namely, Hawkes processes.
7 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
This paper explored how mainstream and fringe Web communities
share mainstream and alternative news sources with a particular
focus on how communities influence each other. We collected mil-
lions of posts from Twitter, Reddit, and 4chan, and analyzed the
occurrence and temporal dynamics of news shared from 45 main-
stream and 54 alternative news sites. We found that users on the
different platforms prefer different news sources, especially when
it comes to alternative ones. We also explored complex temporal
dynamics and we discovered, for example, that Twitter and Reddit
users tend to post the same stories within a relatively short period
of time, with 4chan posts lagging behind both of them. However,
when a story becomes popular after a day or two, it is usually the
case it was posted on 4chan first, lending some credence to 4chan’s
supposed influence on the Web.
Using Hawkes processes, we also modeled the influence the indi-
vidual platforms have on each other, while also taking into account
influence that comes from external sources of information. We
found that the interplay between platforms manifests in subtle, yet
meaningful ways. For example, of all the platforms and subreddits,
Twitter by far has the most influence in terms of the number of
URLs it causes to be posted to other platforms, and contributes
to the share of alternative news URLs on the other platforms to a
much greater degree than to the share of mainstream news URLs.
After Twitter, The_Donald subreddit and /pol/ are the next most
influential when it comes to alternative news URLs. For such URLs,
The_Donald is less influenced by the other platforms than /pol/,
and has a higher background rate, i.e., more of the URLs posted
there come from other sources.
To the best of our knowledge, our analysis constitutes the first
attempt to characterize the dissemination of mainstream and alter-
native news across multiple social media platforms, and to estimate
a quantifiable influence between them. Overall, our findings shed
light on how Web communities influence each other and can be
extremely useful to better understand and detect false information
as well as informing the design of systems that aim to trace the
origins of fake stories and mitigate their dissemination.
Limitations. This work presented an initial attempt to measure
the influence among popular Web communities. To this end, we
13
considered news propagation on Web communities as dictated by
the posting of URLs from mainstream and alternative news sources.
Naturally, this approach is not without limitations, as we did not
account for the content of the information, which can exist and
propagate in various forms, such as textual claims, images, and
videos. For example, there may be a lot of direct information trans-
ferred from 4chan occurring via screenshots, due to its ephemeral
nature and orientation towards images. In fact, this highlights the
complexity of the problem, as, e.g., distinguishing if an image deliv-
ers the same information as a textual claim in an article, is far from
a straightforward task. Moreover, we did not examine the content
of the news stories shared.
FutureWork. As part of future work, we plan to explore advanced
image recognition techniques to look for screenshots shared among
the different platforms, as well as Natural Language Processing
methods to determine whether stories become a part of the plat-
form’s narrative of events – i.e., whether users continue to talk
about stories without actually posting a relevant URL itself. We
believe efforts into understanding how the growing phenomenon of
alternative and fake information sources affects multiple platforms
can help inform detection and mitigation techniques against misin-
formation and disinformation campaigns, and our work constitutes
a first step in that direction.
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